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ABSTRACT 
 
 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is one of the most commonly used protocols for handling sessions 
for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)-based communications, and the security of SIP is becoming 
increasingly important. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a password authenticated key agreement 
protocol for SIP by using smart cards to protect the VoIP communications between users. Their 
protocol provided some unique features, such as mutual authentication, no password table needed, and 
password updating freely. In this study, we performed cryptanalysis of Zhang et al.’s protocol and 
found that their protocol was vulnerable to the impersonation attack although the protocol could 
withstand several other attacks. A malicious attacker could compute other users’ privacy keys and then 
impersonated the users to cheat the SIP server. Furthermore, we proposed an improved password 
authentication key agreement protocol for SIP, which overcame the weakness of Zhang et al.’s protocol 
and was more suitable for VoIP communications. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) as an IP-based telephony protocol was proposed by Rosenberg et al. 
at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Multi-Party Multimedia Session Control (MMUSIC) 
Working Group [1]. It is used for creating, modifying and terminating multimedia sessions between one 
or more participants as an application layer signaling protocol [1]. SIP is a text-based protocol, and has 
ability to operate on TCP or UDP and to control all the signaling requirements during a VoIP session. 
Similar to HTTP, SIP is a request-response protocol, and so constructing secure mutual authentication 
and key agreement mechanism is a critical issue for SIP-based IP telephony services. 
 
The original authentication protocol for SIP was based on HTTP Digest authentication, so it was not 
strong enough for providing acceptable security level in practice [2-3]. In order to strengthen the 
security of SIP, several authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed [4-17] for the 
prevalent VoIP service. In 2004, Badra and Urien [4] firstly introduced smartcards to remote 
authenticate passwords using public key encryption. In 2005, Yang et al. [5] reported that the original 
SIP authentication protocol was vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and the server-
spoofing attack, and they proposed a SIP authentication protocol to overcome these weaknesses. 
However, Yang et al.’s protocol was vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and involved 
expansive exponential computation, so it was not suitable for the devices with a low computational 
power. Ring et al. [6] proposed an authentication key agreement (AKA) for SIP by using identity-based 
cryptography (IDC). Wang et al. [7] presented an AKA based on certificateless cryptography. Guillet et 
al. [8] suggested mutual authentication for SIP by using a semantic meaning for the SIP opaque values. 
Although these protocols avoid the requirement of a large Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the 
computational costs of these protocols are still very high due to the usage of expansive bilinear pairings.  
         
In order to reduce the computational costs and improve efficiency, several protocols based on elliptic 
curve cryptosystem (ECC) have been proposed [10-11, 14-17]. In 2009, Wu et al. [10] proposed an SIP 
authentication protocol based on ECC. Since ECC offered a level of security comparable to the classical 
cryptosystems that use much larger size keys, Wu et al.’s protocol would reduce computational costs 
efficiently. In Wu et al.’s protocol, the communicating parties shared a common secret beforehand 
  
between the IM Services Identity Module (ISIM) and the Authentication Center (AC). Although, this 
pre-shared key protocol was more efficient, the problem of distributing the shared secrets made this 
solution hard to scale up. In 2010, Yoon et al. [11] claimed that Wu et al.’s protocol was suffered from 
Denning-Sacco attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, and Stolen-verifier attacks. To strengthen the 
security, they also suggested an AKA protocol for SIP based on ECC. However, Gokhroo et al. [12] 
argued that Yoon et al.’s protocol still suffered from both off-line password guessing attacks and replay 
attacks. Recently, a new AKA protocol based on nonce for SIP was proposed by Tsai et al. [13]. In their 
protocol, only exclusive-or operations and one-way hash function was used to realize mutual 
authentication and key agreement, so it reduced the computational costs efficiently. Unfortunately, 
Tsai’s protocol was vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks, stolen verifier attacks and could 
not provide perfect forward secrecy and known-key secrecy. To overcome above weaknesses, Arshad et 
al. [14] proposed an enhanced AKA protocol based on ECC. But, He et al. [15] demonstrated that 
Arshad et al.’s protocol still suffered from the off-line password-guessing attack.  
 
Most recently, Zhang et al. [17] argued that the existing protocols designed for SIP required the SIP 
server maintaining a password or verification table, which makes these protocols vulnerable to stolen-
verifier attacks, server-spoofing attacks, insider attacks and password guessing attacks. On the other 
hand, as the password and verification tables are usually very large, the maintenance and updating 
problems would reduce its applicability for practical use. Motivated by the above analysis, Zhang et al. 
proposed a new AKA protocol for SIP by using smart cards to avoid storing password tables at the SIP 
server. Unfortunately, their effort failed to address the impersonation attack problem. 
 
In this study, we carried out cryptanalysis of Zhang et al.’s protocol and show that Zhang et al.’s 
protocol was vulnerable to the impersonation attacks. To solve this problem, we proposed a much 
improved protocol based on Zhang et al.’s protocol by using smart cards. The proposed protocol not 
only preserved the merits of Zhang et al.’s protocol but also solved the security problem of 
impersonation attacks. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the SIP authentication procedure in 
general. In Section 3, a brief review of Zhang et al.’s protocol is given. Section 4 presents a 
  
cryptanalysis of Zhang et al.’s protocol. Our authenticated key agreement protocol is detailed in Section 
5. In Section 6, the security of our proposed protocol is discussed. The performance of the proposed 
protocol is examined in Section 7, and the paper is concluded in Section 8. 
 
 
2.  SIP AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURE 
  The security of the original SIP authentication is based on the challenge-response mechanism. In 
order to verify the identity of the user or the server in the authentication procedure, the original SIP 
authentication protocol requires the user and the server pre-sharing a password beforehand. The details 
of the original SIP authentication procedure are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 SIP authentication procedure 
 
1:Step :User Server REQUEST  
The user submits a REQUEST to the server. 
2 :Step : ( , )Server User CHALLENGE nonce realm  
            The server generates a CHALLENGE as a response message consisting of a nonce and the 
user’s realm. The realm used in the CHALLENGE is the digest algorithm. The server then 
sends the response message CHALLENGE to the user. 
3 :Step : ( , , , )User Server response nonce realm username response  
            The user computes a RESPONSE=h(nonce, realm, username, response) by using an nonce 
value, realm, username and the computed response value, where h(.) is a one-way hash function 
User       
Compute a RESPONSE    
( , , , )h nonce realm username response      
Server       
1. REQUEST 
2. CHALLENCE (nonce, realm) 
3. RESPONSE (nonce, realm, username, response)  
Generate a CHALLENGE (nonce, realm) 
4. Verify the nonce 
    Compute h (nonce, realm, username, response) and compare it with RESPONSE 
  
used for  generating a digest authentication message. Then the user sends back the RESPONSE 
to the server. 
Step4: After receiving the RESPONSE message, the server extracts the user’s password in relation to 
the username. The server then verifies whether the nonce is correct. If it is correct, the server 
computes a hash value h (nonce, realm, username, response), and then checks whether this hash 
value is equal to the received value of RESPONSE. If they match, the server authenticates the 
identity of the user.  
 
The limitations of this authentication mechanism in a real application are summarized as follows: 1) 
lack of media protection mechanism, and the sensitive message can be intercepted; 2) vulnerable to 
offline dictionary guessing attack, since the security of the authentication mechanism depends on a 
simple password only; 3) the password table needing configure beforehand at the SIP server side, 
which makes this authentication mechanism suffer from stolen-verifier attacks, server-spoofing attacks 
and insider attacks. In addition, the maintenance of the table and the password updating can be 
intractable problems; 4) not providing mutual authentication between the users and the SIP server, so 
that the man-in-middle attacks and the server spoofing attacks may occur; 5) the impersonate attacks 
may be successful by generating a forgery SIP message, since no secure mechanism is provided to 
protect the important parameters in the header field of the SIP message. According to above analysis, the 
original SIP authentication cannot provide services of acceptable security, it needs to be improved for 
SIP-based IP telephony services. 
 
 
3. REVIEW OF ZHANG ET AL.’S PROTOCOL 
In this section, we briefly review Zhang et al.’s protocol as follows: 
 
3.1. System setup phase 
 
In the system setup phase, the SIP server generates several security parameters. 
Step 1:S The SIP server chooses an elliptic curve equation 2 3( , ) : (mod )pE a b y x ax b p    over a 
prime finite field pF , where , pa b F and 3 24 27 0(mod )a b p  . Then it selects a base 
  
point P over ( , )pE a b , and chooses a random integer 
*
R ps Z as a secret key, and then 
computes the public key pubP sP .  
Step 2 :S The SIP server chooses three secure one-way hash functions *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   , 
* *
1( ) : {0,1} {0,1} {0,1}
kh G    , and * *2 ( ) : {0,1} {0,1} {0,1}kh G G     , where G is a 
cyclic  addition group that is generated by P over ( , )pE a b .   
Step 3 :S The SIP server keeps s  secret, and publishes the public information{ ( , ), , , ( ),p pubE a b P P h   
1 2( ), ( )}h h  . 
 
3.2. Registration phase 
 
When the userU  wants to register with the SIP server, it performs the following steps with the 
server. 
Step 1:R The user U chooses its password PW and a random integer *R pa Z . Next, it 
computes ( )h PW a , and sends{ ( ), }h PW a username to the SIP server over a secure channel. 
Step 2 :R The SIP server computes secret information 1( ( ) )R h h PW a username s P . 
Step 3 :R The SIP server stores R in a smart card, and delivers this smart card to the user U in a 
secure channel.  
Step  4 :R The userU stores a in the smart card, and so the smart card contains ( , )R a . 
 
3.3. Authentication phase 
 
When the user U wishes to logon to the SIP server, the smart card and the server perform the 
following steps as shown in Figure 2. 
Step 1:A  : ( , , )U S REQUEST username V W  
The user U  selects a random integer *R pb Z , and computes ( )V bR h username P  and 
( ( ) ) pubW bh h PW a username P  . Then it sends ( , , )REQUEST username V W  to the SIP 
server. 
  
Step  2 :A : ( , , , )sS U CHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
After receiving the request message, the SIP server computes ( )X h username P and 
' 2 ( )W s V X  . It then verifies whether the following equation holds ?'W W . If the 
equation holds, it chooses two random integers *, R pr c Z , and computes 
S cP , ( )K cs V X  , 1( )SK h K r username  '2 ( )sAuth h K W r SK . Next, it sends 
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r to the userU .  
Step 3 :A : ( , )uU S RESPONSE realm Auth  
Upon receiving the challenge message, the user U computes ( ( ) )K bh h PW a username S  
and 1( )SK h K r username . Next it verifies whether the following equation 
holds
?
2 ( ( ( ) ) )s pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK . If the equation holds, it computes 
2 ( ( ( ) ) 1 )u pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK  , and sends ( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  
to the SIP server. 
Step  4 :A After receiving the response message, the SIP server verifies if
?
'
2 ( 1uAuth h K W r   
)SK  holds. If so, the SIP server sets SK as the shared session key with the userU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2. ( )X h username P   
 3. ( ( ) )K bh h PW a username S , 1( )SK h K r username   
 
?
2 ( ( ( ) ) )s pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK  
   If the equation holds, 2 ( ( ( ) ) 1 )u pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK   
1. *R pb Z , ( )V bR h username P  , ( ( ) ) pubW bh h PW a username P  
( , , )REQUEST username V W  
( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  
Server 
( )s  
User U  
( , , ( , ))Username PW Smartcard R a  
' 2 ( )W s V X  , ? 'W W  
If the equation holds, *R pc Z , *R pr Z  
1( )SK h K r username  
'
2 ( )sAuth h K W r SK  
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
4. Check ? '
2 ( 1 )uAuth h K W r SK   
  S cP , ( )K cs V X   
  
 
 
 
Fig.2. Authenticated key agreement phase of Zhang et al.’s protocol 
 
 
4. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL OF ZHANG ET AL. 
 
In this section, we describe our findings that the protocol of Zhang et al. [15] is vulnerable to the 
impersonation attack [16]. 
 
Assuming that an adversary Bob is a legal user; he can impersonate other legal user to cheat the SIP 
server through forging other user’s secret information R . If Bob attempts to impersonate the user iU to 
logon to the SIP server, a possible impersonation attack can be performed as described below: 
1:Step  The adversary Bob computes 1 1( ( ( ) ))s P h h PW a username R   by using his secret 
information R , password PW , secret nonce a and username. Then Bob can construct a valid 
* * ' 1( ( ) )
iU
R h h PW a username s P of the legal user iU , where 'username is iU ’s username, 
and * *,PW a chosen by Bob. Then Bob can impersonate the legal user iU to cheat the SIP 
server. First, Bob chooses a random integer * *R pb Z , and computes 
* * '( )
iU
V b R h username P  and * '* * *( ( ) ) pubW b h h PW a username P  . Next Bob sends 
' * *( , , )REQUEST username V W  to the SIP server. 
2 :Step  Since * * '( )
iU
V b R h username P  is valid, the SIP server computes ' 2 *(W s V    
* * * '( ) ) ( ( ) ) pubh username P b h h PW a username P . Since the computed result 'W equals to 
the received * '* * *( ( ) ) pubW b h h PW a username P , the SIP server proceeds to compute 
S cP , * '( ( ) )K cs V h username P  , '1( )SK h K r username , '2 ( )sAuth h K W r SK ,  
and sends ( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r to the adversary Bob.  
  
3 :Step The adversary Bob can then compute the session key '1( )SK h K r username   
* '*
2 ( ( ( ) ) 1 )u pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK  , and sends the RESPONSE   
message to the SIP server.  
4 :Step  Since the computed result '2 ( 1 )h K W r SK equals to the received uAuth , the SIP server 
accepts the adversary Bob’s login request, and believes that the adversary Bob is the user iU .  
 
According to above analysis, the adversary can easily impersonate any legal user to logon to the SIP 
server at any time. Therefore, Zhang et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the impersonation attack. 
 
 
5. OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
 
In this section, we detail our much improved protocol based on Zhang et al.’s protocol. The newly 
designed protocol could overcome the original protocol’s security weakness while as kept the merits of 
the original SIP protocol, such as no password tables stored on the SIP server. There were three phases 
in our protocol: system setup phase, registration phase, and authentication phase. The procedures of the 
protocol are described in detail as follows: 
 
5.1. System setup phase 
  
Step 1:S The SIP server generates several security parameters: an elliptic curve 
equation 2 3( , ) : (mod )pE a b y x ax b p    over a prime finite field pF , where , pa b F and 
3 24 27 0(mod )a b p  ; a base point P with the order n over ( , )pE a b , where n is a large 
number in terms of security considerations; a cyclic addition group G , which is generated 
by P over ( , )pE a b . 
Step 2 :S  The SIP server chooses a random integer *R ps Z as a secret key, and chooses two secure 
one-way hash functions *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   and *1( ) : {0,1} {0,1}kh G G G     . 
  
Step 3 :S The SIP server keeps s  secret, and publishes the public information { ( , ), , ( ),pE a b P h   
1( )}h  . 
 
5.2. Registration phase 
 
When the userU  wants to register with the SIP server, it performs the following steps with the SIP 
server. 
Step 1:R : ( ( ), )U S h PW a username  
The userU selects its password PW freely and chooses a random integer *R pa Z . Then it 
computes ( )h PW a  and sends{ ( ), }h PW a username to the SIP server over a secure channel. 
Step 2 :R After receiving the information from the user U  , the SIP server computes secret 
information 
( )
( )
h PW a
R P
h username s
   for the userU . 
Step 3 :R The SIP server stores R in the memory of a smart card, and delivers the smart card to the 
userU in a secure channel.  
Step  4 :R Upon receiving the smart card, the userU stores a in the smart card, as so the memory of 
the smart card contains ( , )R a . 
 
5.3. Authentication phase 
 
When the user U wishes to logon to the SIP server, the smart card and the SIP server cooperate to 
perform the following steps as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  S cP , '( )SK ch username W  
2. ' ( ( ) ) ( )W h username s V h PW a bP     
1. *R pb Z , V bR , ( )W bh PW a P  
( , , )REQUEST username V W  
Server 
( )s  
User U  
( , , ( , ))Username PW Smartcard R a  
?
'W W , If the equation holds, *, R pc r Z  
'
1( )sAuth h S W SK r
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig.3. Authenticated key agreement phase of our protocol 
 
Step 1:A : ( , , )U S REQUEST username V W   
The userU selects a random integer *R pb Z , and computesV bR  and ( )W bh PW a P . It 
sends ( , , )REQUEST username V W  to the SIP server. 
Step  2 :A : ( , , , )sS U CHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
After receiving the request message, the SIP server computes ' ( ( ) )W h username s V   
( ( ) ) ( )h username s bR bh PW a P   . It then checks whether the following equation 
?
'W W  holds. If so, it generates two random integers *, R pc r Z , and computes S cP , 
'( ) ( ) ( )SK ch username W cbh PW a h username P  and '1( )sAuth h S W SK r . Then it 
sends ( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r  to the userU .  
Step 3 :A : ( , )uU S RESPONSE realm Auth  
Upon receiving the challenge message, the userU inputs its password PW and username to 
compute the session key ' ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SK bh PW a h username S cbh PW a h username P  . Then 
it checks whether the equation 
?
'
1( )sAuth h S W SK r  holds. If the equation holds, it 
computes '1( 1)uAuth h S W SK r  , and sends ( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth to the SIP server. 
Otherwise, it deletes the received information and the protocol stops. 
Step  4 :A After receiving the response message, the SIP server verifies whether the equation 
?
'
1( 1)uAuth h S W SK r  holds. If the message is authenticated, the SIP server sets SK as 
the shared session key with the user U ; otherwise, it deletes the received information and the 
protocol stops.  
 3. ' ( ) ( )SK bh PW a h username S   
 
?
'
1( )sAuth h S W SK r  
   If the equation holds, '1( 1)uAuth h S W SK r   
( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  
4. Check ? '
1( 1)uAuth h S W SK r   
  
 
 
6. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
The newly designed protocol is a modified form of Zhang et al.’s protocol. The security analysis of 
Zhang et al.’s protocol was discussed and demonstrated in the original protocol. Therefore, in this 
section, only extra security features (e.g. withstanding impersonation attacks) are discussed.  
 
Theorem 1. Our protocol can resist the impersonation attack. 
 
Proof. Assuming that an adversary Bob forges a request message (REQUEST  * *, , )username V W  by 
constructing *V and *W , and sends it to the SIP server to impersonate a legal user. The SIP server will 
find the attack by checking whether 'W and *W  are equal, because Bob cannot construct a valid 
( ( ) /( ( ) ))R h PW a h username s P   without the knowledge of the secret key s . In addition, even if 
Bob is a legal user, he cannot compute other legal user’s privacy key by using its privacy key, since 
Bob cannot construct a valid R without the knowledge of the secret key s . 
 
On the other hand, an adversary Bob may generate a random number * * *, R pc r Z , compute 
* *S c P and *sAuth  , and then send a forge challenge message * * *( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth c P r  to 
the userU  to impersonate the SIP server. However, the CHALLENGE message cannot go through the 
verification process of the userU , as Bob does not know the password PW , nonce a and random 
number b . 
 
Furthermore, an adversary Bob may guess authentication information *uAuth ; send a forged response 
message *( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  to the SIP server to impersonate the userU . However, the SIP 
server will find the attack by checking whether
?
* '
1( 1)uAuth h S W SK r  holds. Therefore, the 
proposed protocol can resist the impersonation attack. 
 
  
 
7. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we compare the performance of our proposed protocol with He et al.’s protocol and 
Zhang et al.’s protocol. First, we define some notations as follows: 
(1) ecsmT  the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve. 
(2) ecpaT  the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve. 
(3) hT  the time for executing a one-way hash function. 
 (4) invT  the time for executing a modular inversion operation. 
 
In our proposed protocol, the user registration takes one hash operation ( )h PW a at the user side 
and one scalar multiplication of elliptic curve ( ( ) /( ( ) ))R h PW a h username s P  at the server side.  In 
the authentication phase, three scalar multiplication operations are needed to compute ,V bR  
( )W bh PW a P and ' ( )SK bh PW a ; four one-way hash function operations are required to 
compute ( ), ( ), sh username h PW a Auth and uAuth at the user side. The SIP server takes three scalar 
multiplication operations to obtain ' ( ( ) ) ,W h username s V S  andc SK ; and three one-way hash 
function operations to get ( ), sh username Auth and uAuth .  
 
Table 1 shows that He et al.’s protocol has slightly better performance than our proposed protocol. 
However, in He et al.’s protocol, the SIP server needs to store a hashed password for verification 
purposes, which makes the solution hard to scale up. The protocol proposed by Zhang et al. can 
overcome this weakness, but their protocol suffers from impersonation attacks as described in Section 4. 
Since our protocol can reduce the operations of scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve, it is 
more efficient than Zhang et al.’s protocol, as shown in Table 1. Compared with Zhang et al.’s protocol, 
our protocol not only can resist impersonation attacks but also reduce the computational costs. So, it is 
more suitable for SIP. 
 
 
  
8. CONCULSION 
 
In this study, we reviewed some authentication key agreement protocols for SIP. Zhang et al.’s 
protocol provided some unique properties such as no password or verification table stored on the SIP 
server compared with other related protocols. Unfortunately, we found that Zhang et al.’s protocol was 
vulnerable to the impersonation attack. This means an adversary can compute other user’s privacy key 
by using the adversary’s privacy key, and then impersonate other legal user to cheat the SIP server. To 
address the problem, we proposed a much improved protocol based on Zhang et al.’s protocol. The 
proposed protocol not only inherited the merits of Zhang et al.’s protocol, i.e. no need to maintain any 
password or verification table on the SIP server, but also solved the security problem of suffering from 
impersonation attacks with low computational costs. 
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Table 1. Comparisons with two existing protocols 
 
 
 
Computational cost (client) 
Computational cost (server) 
He et al. [13] Zhang et al. [15] 
3 1 6ecsm ecpa hT T T   
5 1 5 1ecsm ecpa h invT T T T    
3 3ecsm hT T  
3 3ecsm hT T  
No password or verifier table 
Resist impersonation attacks 
Our protocol 
No
NoYes 
Yes
Yes 
Yes 
Computational cost (Total) 6 6ecsm hT T 8 2 11 1ecsm ecpa h invT T T T  
3 4ecsm hT T
4 4ecsm hT T  
7 8ecsm hT T  
